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Why Did First Canadian Army 
Not Get the Acclaim of the 
Canadian Corps? 
J . L .  G R A N A T S T E I N
Abstract : Canada’s soldiers in the Second World War did not receive the 
same acclaim from historians as the Canadian Corps in the Great War. 
Some of the blame for this rests on official historian C.P. Stacey, but 
some also rests on the loss of leadership material to the Royal Canadian 
Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force and on General Harry Crerar who 
was less of a commander than Sir Arthur Currie. But much also lies with 
historians who did not look beyond the Normandy fighting to the superb 
performance of the Canadians in the last nine months of the war.
The Canadian Corps of the First World War earned a sterling reputation as one of the very best Allied formations on the 
Western Front. At Ypres in April 1915, the Canadian Division fought 
well despite the horrors of the German gas attack. On the Somme 
the next year the Corps again did well in a grueling, costly battle, 
securing one of the few significant victories at Courcelette. In 1917 
there was Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele, and in 1918 the Canadian 
Corps’ four divisions played an extraordinary role in the Hundred Days 
that ended the war, a role so distinguished that the name “Canada’s 
Hundred Days” does not seem unjustified. Historians here and abroad 
are generally agreed on the Canadians’ stellar performance, the only 
carping being that some British and the Australian corps were as good.
But in the Second World War, Canada’s soldiers did not receive 
similar kudos at the time or subsequently from most British and 
American historians. The Canadian army had only the disasters of 
Hong Kong and Dieppe to mark the first three years of war, and it 
was not until the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 that a division and an 
armoured brigade saw sustained action. Later in the Italian campaign, 
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the 5th Canadian Armoured Division arrived, and the I Canadian 
Corps fought very well, but in a theatre that was generally viewed as 
secondary, certainly so after D-Day and the invasion of France.
From June-July 1944 to V-E Day, the First Canadian Army 
consisted of the II Canadian Corps made up of the 2nd and 3rd 
Infantry Divisions, the 4th Armoured Division, and 2nd Armoured 
Brigade. The Canadians fought their way across Juno beach, through 
the Norman hedgerows, along the Channel coast, at the terrible 
fighting for the Scheldt estuary, in the Rhineland, across the Rhine, 
and in the liberation of the Netherlands.
The record was a proud one, but it has sadly not received its 
due from non-Canadian scholars. None pay much attention to the 
Canadian performance from September 1944 to V-E Day, but the 
historians have faulted the Canadians for their alleged hesitancy in 
Normandy, in particular their slowness in closing the Falaise Gap 
in August 1944. British historians labeled the Canadian advance 
“frustratingly sluggish,” and the American Carlo D’Este regretted 
“the inability of the Canadians to develop their actions more quickly” 
and for “failing to make the most of their opportunities.” D’Este 
even repeated Colonel Charles Stacey’s devastating comment that an 
early closing of the Gap “might even, conceivably, have enabled us to 
end the war some months sooner than actually was the case.”1 And 
British journalist and historian Max Hastings lamented “the feeble 
performance of First Canadian Army” in the Norman battles.2
Stacey, the Canadian Army’s official historian of the Second 
World War, acknowledged the problems, blaming the Canadians 
lack of battle experience and “a proportion of regimental officers 
whose attitude towards training was casual and haphazard rather 
than urgent and scientific.” His analysis of the Normandy campaign, 
Stacey continued, supported this view: “Regimental officers of this 
type, where they existed, were probably the weakest element in the 
Army.” Not the generals—“Canadian generalship in Normandy does 
not suffer by comparison with that of the other Allies engaged.” Not 
1  C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe 1944-
1945 Vol. III: Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960), 276.
2  E. Belfield and H. Essame, The Battle for Normandy (London: Pan, 1983), 283; 
Carlo D’Este, Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the 
Allied Campaign (London: Pan, 1984), 457; and Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and 
the Battle for Normandy, 1944 (London: Pan, 1984), 358.
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the ordinary soldiers who, Stacey agreed, fought well. No, the blame 
lay with “that proportion of officers who were not fully competent 
for their appointments, and whose inadequacy appeared in action 
and sometimes had serious consequences.”3 We do not need to agree 
with these assessments, but we do need to consider them seriously. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jack English was likely the first to argue with 
Stacey, if not the foreign historians, by blaming the failings of 
Canadian generals rather than regimental officers for the weaknesses 
both in training their men and in leading them into battle.4 Terry 
Copp came out swinging some years later, pointing to the time in 
action of the Canadian divisions as being responsible for higher 
casualties than suffered by British divisions and, by implication, 
seeing this as an explanation for such failings as occurred.5 A volume 
I wrote, The Best Little Army in the World: The Canadians in 
Northwest Europe 1944-1945, in retrospect perhaps ought to have 
been titled The Best Little Army in the World? with the question 
mark very much in bold type.6 Again, we do not need to agree 
with the criticisms of First Canadian Army, but we should try to 
understand why they were made. 
So too should we try to assess the differences, such as they were, 
between the performance of Canadians in the two world wars. In the 
Great War, Canada put some 620,000 men into uniform, a number 
that included 100,000 conscripts. There was no Canadian navy to 
speak of, with a fleet of small ships and at most 9,000 officers and 
ratings. There was no Canadian Air Force until the very end of the 
war, some 22,000 men serving in the Royal Naval Air Service and 
the Royal Flying Corps, the precursors to the Royal Air Force. In 
other words, with the exception of some 30,000 who served outside 
the Canadian Corps, more than a half million men wore khaki. Those 
3  Stacey, 274-75. See the analysis of these comments in Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: 
Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World Wars (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2006), 193ff.
4  John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of 
Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991).
5  Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003). The review of this book by Brian Holden Reid tartly observed 
that Copp “comes perilously close to bringing a charge that the British were prepared 
to fight to the last Canadian.” Brian Holden Reid, The Army Training and Doctrine 
Bulletin 6 (Fall/Winter, 2003), 67.
6  Granatstein, J.L. The Best Little Army in the World: The Canadians In Northwest 
Europe, 1944-1945. (Toronto: Harper Collins, 2015).
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with leadership capabilities found their way to the divisions in France 
and Flanders, and the fighting from April 1915 to the Armistice in 
November 1918 offered ample opportunity for those leaders to rise 
through the ranks.
Matters were different in the Second World War. The Royal 
Canadian Navy for its part increased its pre-war numbers fifty-fold, 
enlisting 100,000 in all on a base of roughly 2,000 regulars. These 
men too—and their leaders—served at sea, not in the field with the 
army. The Royal Canadian Air Force, tiny at the outbreak of war, 
increased some eighty times to number 250,000 all told. The war in 
the air attracted the most adventurous and in many cases the best 
educated, the most intelligent, and the fittest. The army itself hived 
off some of its best men into commando, airborne, and specialist 
corps. In a very real sense, the cream of the crop, a huge number 
of potential leaders, did not join the infantry.7 While the impact of 
this cannot be quantified, there can be little doubt that some of the 
(alleged) deficiencies of the army should be attributed to the way 
the air force, navy, and army units outside the infantry battalions 
scooped up much of the best human material. It is also likely that 
many of those who avoided the army did so because of the stories 
their fathers had told them of the horrors of trench warfare. Again 
this cannot be quantified, but it certainly had its effects—and these 
same effects were felt in the British and American armies.
There is another important explanation for the Canadian Corps’ 
superb record. The 1st Canadian Division went into action in early 
1915 and passed what it had learned to the 2nd Division at the end 
of that year; the 1st and 2nd Divisions duly contributed to the 3rd 
Division; and the first three gave their accumulated expertise and 
some of their experienced commanders to the 4th Division which 
went into the line in late 1916. By August 1918 when the Canadian 
Corps began the triumphant Hundred Days that smashed the German 
army in the field, both the leaders and soldiers had learned how to 
fight and manoeuvre on the battlefield, and their organization and 
equipment were first class. The experience gained by each division 
7  Allan D. English utilized this phrase for the RCAF. Allan D. English, The Cream 
of the Crop: Canadian Air Crew, 1939-1945 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1966). Christopher Pugsley made the comparison between the infantry of the 
two world wars: Christopher Pugsley, “Learning from the Canadian Corps on the 
Western Front,” Canadian Military History, Vol. XV, 1(2006), 6.
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had been shared in a Canadian Corps that saw itself as, and was, 
a learning institution. While it produced terrible casualties, time in 
action also guaranteed that expertise was gained and that leaders 
sprang forward from the ranks.
Matters were very different in the Second World War. The 
entire Hong Kong force was lost in December 1941, and much of the 
leadership and potential leadership of the 2nd Canadian Division was 
slaughtered or taken prisoner at Dieppe in August 1942. The officers 
and men of I Canadian Corps learned on the job in Italy from mid-
1943 until early 1945, but the extent to which the lessons learned—
and the leaders who had mastered them—were transferred to First 
Canadian Army before and after D-Day is uncertain. Yes, General 
Guy Simonds and some of his key staff officers did return to England 
early in 1944 to take over II Canadian Corps, but it was nonetheless 
a long learning experience before the Canadians in France became 
first class fighters. The 3rd Division had eleven months in action (and 
more time in “intense combat” with more casualties in Normandy 
than any British division); the 2nd Division (second in time in action 
and in casualties in Normandy) had ten months in action; and the 
General Sir Julian Byng talking to General Sir Arthur Currie. February, 1918. [Library and 
Archives Ca PA-002448]
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4th Armoured Division had nine months combat experience. This 
was vastly different than the First World War when even the 4th 
Canadian Division fought for two years; moreover the Canadian senior 
commanders in Northwest Europe had far less combat experience 
than their predecessors of the Great War. In other words, time in 
action and the expertise gained mattered greatly. Canada’s Second 
World War experience was very different than the First.
There is one additional factor. Sir Arthur Currie is generally 
considered to have been Canada’s greatest soldier. No one accords 
that designation to Harry Crerar, the General Officer Commanding-
in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of First Canadian Army in 1944-45. Currie went 
overseas in 1914 as a brigade commander, fought at Ypres in April 
1915, took over the 1st Division later that year, and led it successfully 
through the Somme fighting and at Vimy. He was mentored by Sir 
Julian Byng and he took over command of the Corps in mid-1917 and 
directed its operations brilliantly through the remainder of the war. 
Like his soldiers and his leadership cadre, Currie mastered his craft 
in the field and in action.
General H.D.G. Crerar did not have the same opportunity or 
similar ability. Like Currie, Crerar had no charisma, but unlike Currie 
he was more of a military bureaucrat than a great commander. He 
had fought well in the artillery in the Great War, and he remained in 
the tiny Permanent Force through the 1920s and 1930s, only reaching 
brigadier rank just before the outbreak of war in 1939. His interwar 
service made Crerar into the perfect staff officer, a master of detailed 
planning and memoranda, and a skilled bureaucratic warrior. This did 
not sit well with his subordinates in France in 1944. Major-General 
George Kitching called him “a good schoolteacher who rehearsed 
every word he offered to two or more people.…a ham actor with 
alliterative prepared spiels.” Crerar had a first class brain, Major-
General W.J. Megill recalled, “but a difficult personality. He couldn’t 
raise any more enthusiasm than a turnip, was completely cold and 
almost useless in a discussion.” But, Megill said, “he could write a 
beautifully organized paper on that discussion.”8
Nonetheless, Crerar’s role in creating the army of the Second 
World War at Canadian Military Headquarters in Britain and as Vice-
8  J.L. Granatstein, The Weight of Command: Voices of Canada’s Second World War 
Generals and Those Who Knew Them (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 2016), 36-37, 74.
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Chief and then Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in Ottawa cannot 
be understated. He became CGS in 1940 and won the government’s 
agreement to create the five division First Canadian Army, no mean 
achievement. But Crerar was also the officer who had pressed to 
send troops to Hong Kong, and later in England he lobbied hard to 
have Canada provide the force for the Dieppe raid. His bureaucratic 
skills let him escape unscathed from these two debacles, and nothing 
interrupted his rise to the top of the heap. He had been a protégé 
of Andrew McNaughton in the Great War and after, but he had no 
hesitation in England in 1943 in going behind McNaughton’s back 
and pointing out his weaknesses as an army commander to Canadian 
politicians and British generals. There can be little doubt that Crerar 
was correct in his criticisms, but he had acted in a most underhanded 
fashion. His efforts had much to do with McNaughton’s sacking in late 
1943 and his own succession as GOC-in-C of First Canadian Army 
in early 1944. Similarly, when he was in Italy briefly as commander 
of I Canadian Corps in late 1943, Crerar had tried hard to sideline 
Major-General Guy Simonds, a favourite of Eighth Army commander 
General Bernard Montgomery. Simonds, then commanding a division, 
was without question the ablest Canadian senior officer of the war, 
and perhaps Crerar’s only rival for command of the First Canadian 
Army.9 Such actions did him no credit.
Currie in comparison had to fend off only General R.E.W. Turner 
who was nominally his senior, but he did this by establishing a 
battlefield record much more than by stabbing his Britain-based rival 
in the back, and his relationships with his staff and his subordinates 
in the Corps were harmonious.10 Currie could never inspire his troops 
9  See J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders 
in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), Chapters 3, 4, and 6 on 
McNaughton, Crerar, and Simonds. See also Paul Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian 
General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2007); on Crerar, John A. English, Patton’s Peers: The Forgotten Allied Field 
Commanders of the Western Front 1944-45 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2009), 
Chapter 1; and John Nelson Rickard, The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General 
A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army 1939-1943 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010) for a strong defence of McNaughton. On Simonds, see Douglas 
Delaney, Corps Commanders: Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), Chapter 4. 
10  For a vigorous defence of Turner, see William Stewart, The Embattled General: 
Sir Richard Turner and the First World War (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2015). Stewart’s account adds much but its force is weakened by a too-strong 
dislike of Currie.
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with fiery phrases or by his soldierly appearance, but he did earn and 
keep the loyalty and high regard of those who worked with and for 
him. Crerar, on the other hand, inspired no one, neither the soldiers 
in the line nor his senior leaders and staff, and this undoubtedly had 
its effect on the way the Canadians were perceived by the British and 
Americans—and by the historians. The most we can say of Crerar 
is that he strove to keep Canadian national interests to the fore 
in the face of Montgomery’s unwillingness to concede that Canada 
might have had priorities of its own, made few battlefield gaffes, and 
led the largest force ever commanded by a Canadian. Those are all 
important, but they pale beside Currie’s fighting record.
Lt. Gen. Guy Simonds, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and General H. D. G. Crerar. 
[Library and Archives Canada MIKAN 4002428]
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Yet, the same Colonel English who had been so critical of the 
Canadian performance in Normandy in 1998 wrote that “By the 
end of the war, having paid a steep price in blood for the peacetime 
neglect of military professionalism, it was probably the best little 
army in the world. Certainly in the performance of the Canadian 
Army overseas the government of Canada got much more than it 
deserved.” So why did the Canadian record receive such cold critical 
appraisals?
English was absolutely correct that Canadian training was sadly 
flawed for the first two years and more of the war. McNaughton 
and the senior commanders he selected had little interest in training 
or, more likely, did not know how to do it well. The Vancouver 
militiaman Bert Hoffmeister, commanding a company in the Seaforth 
Highlanders in 1940, recalled “I didn’t have anything by way of a 
training manual. I went down to Aldershot and into a store where 
they sold these things, and bought pamphlets.” Then, when he was 
ordered to prepare an operation order for an exercise, “I hadn’t a clue 
as to what an operation order looked like or how to write one…”11 
The Canadians began the war as amateurs. Hoffmeister learned his 
job in three years of training, but some others regrettably did not. 
It took a British officer, the then Lieutenant-General Montgomery 
commanding Southeastern Army in England, to inspect the Canadian 
formations and units, discover their weaknesses, and shake them up. 
Monty got rid of most of the ineffective leaders, sending them home 
to Canada or to retirement. In all, eight of twenty-two major-generals 
and above who commanded divisions, corps, or the First Canadian 
Army overseas were fired before they saw action, and two more were 
relieved soon after their first battle.
McNaughton himself was one of those replaced in 1943. By then, 
over his objections at the breaking up of First Canadian Army, two 
Canadian divisions and an armoured brigade were in Italy, and 
good commanders and battle-tested soldiers had begun to emerge. 
Simonds learned to lead in action in Sicily and Italy. Chris Vokes 
was an effective if unimaginative brigade and division commander, 
and Bert Hoffmeister, who rose from company to division command 
very quickly, was superb. There were also many unit and company 
commanders who demonstrated all the traits of battlefield leadership.
11  Douglas Delaney, The Soldiers’ General: Bert Hoffmeister at War (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 22.
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Simonds became the II Canadian Corps’ commander a few 
months before D-Day and, however able and creative as a tactician 
he was, his senior commanders in the first months in Normandy were 
flawed indeed. Major-General Rod Keller of the 3rd Division was 
popular with the troops but weak, mistrusted by his staff—“Keller 
was yeller,” his staff muttered—and rightly considered ineffective by 
British senior officers. For what he believed to be sound reasons (and 
the likelihood that he could see no ready successor in the 3rd Division’s 
brigadiers), Simonds refused suggestions he be replaced, and Keller 
hung on until he was wounded in an errant air force bombing during 
Operation Totalize on 8 August.12 Simonds fired George Kitching, his 
close friend and the commander of the 4th Armoured Division, in the 
midst of the Falaise Gap fighting. Charles Foulkes, the commander of 
the 2nd Division, was perhaps even more uninspiring and ineffective 
than Keller but, protected by his patron General Crerar, he survived 
long enough to be promoted to command of I Canadian Corps in 
Italy. Too many of his soldiers did not, and unfortunately the flaws 
of the three division commanders helped shape the Canadians’ 
unsatisfactory record and reputation in Normandy.
But within the nine months remaining of the war in Europe, the 
Canadian commanders improved mightily. The division commanders 
at the end of the war—Vokes, Harry Foster, Bruce Matthews, Holly 
Keefler, and Hoffmeister—were very good, and Matthews and 
Hoffmeister were first-rate. Simonds was a fine corps commander—“a 
first-class commander with a most original brain and full of initiative,” 
General Sir Brian Horrocks said—and his creation of armoured 
personnel carriers in August 1944 revolutionized armoured warfare. 
Charles Foulkes turned out to be much better as a corps commander 
than as a division GOC and this and his friendly relations with 
Crerar helped to ensure that he, rather than Simonds, became the 
most important Canadian military figure of the postwar years.
We ought not forget that Canada’s Great Power partners also 
had to get the right leaders and battle experience as they learned 
how to fight the Germans. Both the British and Americans suffered 
their debacles and both replaced generals and colonels in action in 
wholesale lots. Allied combat effectiveness varied dramatically, just 
as much as the Canadians’ proficiency sometimes did. All one can say 
12  See Granatstein, The Generals, 167-68.
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with confidence is that Allied commanders and soldiers learned that 
beating the Germans was never easy.
Charles Stacey, whose comments on Canadian deficiencies in 
training and in action, likely did much to shape British and American 
historians’ critiques, came to regret his words. In a letter to John 
English almost three decades after The Victory Campaign appeared, 
he said “It is a pity perhaps that we focus our attention so much on 
Normandy, for in the nature of things our troops appear to better 
advantage…in the post-Normandy stages….I almost regret having 
written the rather severe comment on Canadian regimental officers,” 
Stacey continued, because of “the use that UK and US writers” made 
of it. “They use my stuff as a basis for assuming the superiority of 
their training and work in the field to ours.” That, he concluded, 
remained unproven.13 So it did—and still does.
13  Stacey’s letter of 4 November 1987, quoted in Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 195, and in 
Granatstein, Best Little Army, 278-79.
Group portrait of Generals of 1st Canadian Army. L. to r.: (seated) H.S. Maczek, G. Simonds, 
H.D.G. Crerar, C. Faulkes, B.M. Hoffmeister; (standing) R.H. Keefler, A.B. Matthews. H.W. 
Foster, R.W. Moncel, S.B. Rawlings. [Library and Archives Ca PA-137473]
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What we can say is that both Stacey and English were correct. 
There seems no doubt that some regimental officers were not up 
to the job. That Simonds fired two battalion commanders (and a 
brigade commander who sympathized too much with his battalion 
Commanding Officers) in late July in Normandy makes this clear. 
But at the same time, as English argued, there were also general 
officers who were not effective. The three division commanders in the 
Norman fighting all had to be replaced.
It takes time to create an effective army, especially one created out 
of almost nothing. The Canadians were less successful in Normandy 
than many had hoped, but as the war continued, as they learned 
their job, they did become the best little army in the world.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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